00 


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MCCLELLAN 


WHO  HE  is 


A  N  D 


HAT    HE    HAS    DONE 


By  GEORGE  WILKES 


Ttf  eto  ¥ovfc  : 

PUBLISHED  AT  201   WILLIAM  STREKT. 
SINCLAIR  TOUSEY,   WHOIKSAI.K   AGRNT,   121  NA^AU 

1862. 


MCCLELLAN: 


WHO  HE  IS 


AND 


WHAT   HE    HAS    DONE 


Yotfc : 

PUBLISHED  AT  201  WILLIAM  STREET. 
SINCLAIR  TOUSEY,  WHOLKSALB  AGENT,  121  NASSAU  STRBET. 


PREFACE. 


The  following  article  appeared  on  the  4th  Augnst,  in  WILKES' 
SPIRIT  or  THE  TIMES,  and  was  the  fifth  of  a  weekly  series,  which  Mr. 
Wilkes  had  previously  published,  to  the  same  effect.  It  is  rather 
remarkable,  that  the  first  of  this  series,  which  appeared  on  the  7th 
July,  was  followed  in  four  days  by  the  supersedure  of  McClellan 
as  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Armies  ;  and  that  a  few  days  subse 
quent  to  the  publication  of  the  article  we  now  reprint,  General 
Halleck  peremptorily  ordered  the  Army  of  the  Chickahominy  out 
of  the  Peninsula.  It  had  been  said  by  Mr.  Wilkes,  as  early  as  July 
14th,  that  "McClellan  could  never  reach  Richmond  from  his  per 
plexed  position  on  the  James,  except  as  a  captive  ;  and  that  unless 
some  leader,  abler  than  himself,  should  extricate  his  stranded 
forces  and  restore  them  to  the  true  base  of  operations,  nothing  but 
the  providence  of  God  could  save  him  from  capitulation."  The 
Army  of  the  Chickahominy  is  now  back  to  where  it  started  from 
five  months  ago,  but  it  is  reduced  of  its  numbers  by  one-half,  and 
ready  to  co-operate  with  Pope,  along  the  line  which  McClellan 
should  never  have  abandoned.  Further  comment  on  the  judgment 
and  remarks  of  Mr.  Wilkes  is  quite  unnecessary. 

We  have  only  to  add,  in  explanation  of  the  following  article,  tha^ 
just  previous  to  its  appearance,  General  McClellan  had  sent  on 
Brigadiers  Sickles  and  Meagher  to  New  York  to  raise  recruits,  and 
that  while  General  Meagher,  in  alluding  to  McClellan,  was  satis 
fied  simply  with  glorifying  him  as  a  miraculous  genius,  General 
Sickles  denounced  all  adverse  criticism  of  his  idol,  as  springing 
from  '« ignorau^e-orr traitorous  motives." 

THE    PUBLISHERS. 


McCLELLAN-INSIDE  AND  OUT. 


"Mene,  mene,  tekel  upharsin." 

Naw  YORK,  August  4,  1862,  > 

OFFICE  OF  WILKBS'  SPIRIT  OP  THH  TIMBS.     > 

The  strategy  of  the  dazzling  military  genius  who  led  his  troops 
into  the  marshes  of  the  Ghickahominy,  only  to  run  them  out  sc 
fast  that  he  left  his  moaning  wounded  and  his  dead  behind,  h^ 
taken  a  new  direction.  Not  having  driven  the  enemy  "to  the 
wall  "  or  conquered  Richmond,  as  he  promised,  he  now  meditates 
a  march  against  New  York,  and  has  sent  us  a  brace  of  oratorical 
brigadiers,  to  straighten  public  sentiment,  and  teach  us  how  to 
estimate  true  glory.  We  were  not  aware  he  was  so  hard  pushed 
by  criticism  ;  but  we  have  no  doubt  that  he  will  be  just  as  suc 
cessful  in  this  last  effort,  as  he  was  in  his  superb  operations  on  the 
James. 

The  Commissioners  he  sends  us  are  among  the  profoundest  sol 
diers  of  the  age,  and  having  had  the  full  experience  of  a  year  in 
arms,  are  thoroughly  qualified,  not  only  to  declare  the  degrees  of 
"warlike  merit,  but  chartered  to  denounce  all  adverse  question,  of 
their  Young  Napoleon,  as  proceeding  "either  from  ignorance  or 
traitorous  motives."  It  is,  perhaps,  not  a  matter  of  much  signifi 
cance,  that  these  veteran  disciples  of  Marlborough  and  Vauban,  de 
pend  upon  the  countenance  of  Young  Napoleon  for  their  promo 
tion  ;  or,  perhaps  of  moment,  that  General  Sickles,  to  whom  we 
especially  refer,  is  alleged  to  have  charge  of  the  hard  task  of  steering 
him  through  his  troubles  ;  for  these  offsets  to  their  credit,  are  en 
tirely  eclipsed,  and  the  defence  of  Napoleon  made  perfect,  by  the 
shrewd  and  powerful  proofs  presented  in  his  behalf  in  such  con 
vincing  terms  as  "  noble  leader"— "  gallant,  indomitable  and  un 
conquerable  chieftain,"  and  "glorious  Little  Mac  !" 

There  is  a  saying,  however,  that  even  the  best  actors  on  the  stage 
are  the  very  worst  judges  of  the  play  ;  and  on  the  strength  of  that 
great  truth  we  will,  while  granting  the  sincerity  of  these  gentle 
men,  take  the  liberty  of  again  looking  behind  the  curtain,  and  ot 
making  a  diagnosis  of  the  principal  performer. 

To  begin,  then,  at  the  beginning,— for  even  the  prologue  of  a 
mighty  tragedy  is  of  moment, — we  will  glance  at  one  or  two  of  our 
hero's  antecedents  which  bear  upon  the  action. 

George  B.  McClellan  was  born  in  a  Free  State,  and  after  receiv 
ing  his  education  at  "West  Point,  embarked  upon  the  world  with  a 
lieutenantcy .  He,  for  a  long  time  preferred  to  take  up  his  residence 
in.  the  South,  and  soon  became  conspicuously  known  as  the  per 
sonal  friend  of  Beauregard,  and  a  man  of  very  strong  Southern 
proclivities  and  feelings. 

At  an  early  period,  we  find  McClellan  deeply  identified  with 
Southern  filibustering  schemes,  and  finally  trace  him  to  a  promi 
nent  command  in  the  Lone  Star  Association.  The  objects  of  that 
organization  were  notoriously,  the  expansion  and  perpetuation  of 
American  slavery,  by  the  forcible  conquest  of  Cuba  and  its  annexa 
tion  to  the  South  ;  and  it  is  plain  that  McClellan,  from  his  intimate 
intercourse  with  the  leaders  of  the  movement,  was  fully  vers*>d  in 
all  the  secret  aims  of  the  conspiracy.  The  Philadelphia  Daily 


JW150931 


Heuts,  of  July  23,  tiius  briefly  states   the  leading  features  of  the 
movement : 

"General  Quitman,  of  Mississippi,  was  chosen  G-enerallissimo. 
The  five  officers  next  in  rank  to  him  were  also  to  be  Americans, 
and  officers  of  the  regular  array.  To  Q-eneral  Q,uitman  was  confi 
ded  the  delicate  duty,  not  of  selecting,  but  of  purchasing,  the 
•words  and  hearts  of  these. 

41  He  was  a  man  of  address.  The  offer  was  liberal,  the  terms  being 
a  cash  payment  of  $10,090,  with  Cuban  contingencies  to  each,  and 
he  succeeded  in  completing  contracts  with  Albert  Sidney  Johnson, 
Gnstavus  W.  Smith,  Mansfield  Lovell,  J.  K.  Duncan  and  G-eorge 
B.  McClellan. 

"Smith  and  Lovell  received  their  money,  resigned  from  the 
army,  and  entered  upon  their  new  duties.  But  before  the  final 
arrangements  were  consummated  with  our  future  General-in- 
Chief,  Marcy,  then  Secretary  of  State,  in  violation  of  the  plighted 
laith  of  President  Pierce  (who  was  himself  a  filibuster)  directed 
the  Collector  ot  the  Port  of  Mobile  to  seize  and  detain  the  two 
vessels  laden  with  arms  and  munitions  of  war,  then  lying  in  that 
port.  His  subsequent  acts  prevented  the  expedition.  The  question 
of  Lieutenant  McClellan's  resignation  was  held  in  abeyance  some 
days,  when  the  inducements  to  it  were  necessarily  withdrawn." 

The  editor  of  the  News  might  also  have  stated,  in  this  connection, 
that  previous  to  these  nefarious  "Lone  Star"  movements,  McClel- 
lan'.had  been  stealthily  despatched  to  Cuba  by  Jefferson  Davis, 
then  Secretary  of  War,  on  a  mission  of  military  observation,  as 
the  secret  service  records  of  the  Q-overnment  undoubtedly  will 
show. 

The  failure  of  the  Lone  Star  Expedition  left  our  young  hero 
without  any  definite  prospects,  but  his  good  fortune  kept  Jefferson 
Davis  at  the  head  of  the  War  Department,  and  that  excellent  man, 
having  always  regarded  McClellan  with  exceeding  favor,  and  wish 
ing  to  reward  him,  probably,  for  his  sympathies  with  the  South, 
promoted  him  to  be  a  captain  of  infa:atry,  and  then  raised  him  to  the 
dazzling  station  of  Chief  of  the  Commission  of  Observation  which 
represented  the  army  of  the  United  States  before  Sebastopol.  True 
to  these  souvenirs,  and  the  tendencies  which  they  created,  he,  after 
his  return,  united  himself  with  the  Breckenridge  Democracy, 
the  plot  ot  which,  on  the  part,  at  least,  of  its  Southern  engineers, 
was  to  either  throw  the  election  to  the  "  House,"  or,  by  the  return 
of  Lincoln  to  the  Presidency,  to  seize  the  opportunity  for  revolu 
tion. 

Now,  these  antecedents,  though  they  do  not  affect  with  absolute 
suspicion,  the  firmness  of  McClellan's  loyalty,  furnish  us  the  cue  to 
aproblem  whi&h  for  along  time  bewildered  us  in  the  extreme  ;  and 
we  can  now  understand  the  secret  of  that  wondrous  approbation 
with  which  the  high  appointment  of  the  young  Captain  was  receiv 
ed  by  Southern  generals  and  Dixie  journals.  The  veil  was  lifted, 
too,  from  what  had  puzzled  us  the  most,  and  that  was,  the  miracu 
lous  unanimity  with  which  every  man  of  secession  principles 
and  doubtful  loyalty  among  us,  agreed  upon  his  transcendent  tal 
ents  as  a  chieftain.  Loyal  citizens  would  occasionally  differ  on  his 
merits  ;  but  if  a  man  ever  so  lightly  tinged  with  "Southern  rights" 
would  come  in  hearing,  the  peace  patriot  would  be  sure  to  fly  into 
a  rage,  look  threateningly  at  the  critic,  as  if  he  more  than  suspected 
him  to  be  an  abolitionist,  and  swear  that  everybody  was  In  a  con 
spiracy  to  ruin  poor  Little  Mac  !  It  is  true  that  hundreds  of  loyal, 
well-meaning  men  honestly  did  the  same  thing  ;  but  while  there 
were  s^me  among  them  who  did  not,  the  secessionists  adored  and 
lauded  him  without  exception.  Throughout  the  South  the  same 
phenomenon  was  visible,  and  we  would  continually  hear  the  Con- 


federate  journals  saying,  that  the  Yankees  had  but  one  great'gen- 
eral,  and  the  abolitionists  were  trying  to  ruin  him  ! 

The  distinguished  object  of  such  singular  laudation,  could 
hardly  be  insensible  to  its  effects.  Human  nature  is  governed  by 
a  few  simple  laws.  We  love  those  who  love  us,  and  it  is  repug 
nant  to  all  good  feeling,  to  injure  and  despitefully  use,  those  who 
speak  well  of  us.  By  the  very  excellence  of  his  nature,  therefore, 
McClellan  was  emasculated  of  a  great  portion  of  that  vigor  and 
devil  which  is  the  first  requirement  of  a  fighting  general,  and  he 
must  have  painfully  felt,  in  his  moments  of  self-examination,  that 
it  was  his  misfortune  to  be  so  universally  appreciated.  There 
was  one  course,  however,  that  was  still  open  to  him,  and  which 
would  obviate  the  stern  necessity  of  shooting  off  «  our  Southern 
brethren's"  heads,  and  arms,  and  legs.  *A  course,  too,  which,  in 
the  end,  might  be  acquiesced  in  by  Jeff  Davis  himself,  and  give  no 
unappeasable  offence,  even  to  Beauregard,  or  his  confreres  of  the 
Lone-Star  Expedition. 

This  was  a  great  country;  it  had  great  institutions  and  great 
oceans  on  either  side  of  it.  The  American  eagle  ought  to  flap  his 
wings  over  the  entire  continent  for  the  benefit  of  millions  yet  un 
born.  It  was  a  shame  for  "brothers"  to  be  fighting  in  this  way  about 
trifling  points  of  difference,  and  the  thing  must  be  "fixed  up."  He 
(McOlellan)  was  just  the  man  to  do  it.  In  the  South,  he  was  Han 
nibal  ;  in  the  North,  Caesar  and  Napoleon  together;  and  he  might, 
therefore,  under  the  scope  oi  his  great  place,  so  manage  his  cam 
paign,  as  to  drive  the  enemy  into  a  convention,  instead  of  into  battle 
a  V  entrance.  He  was  backed  by  the  resources  of  a  great  country  ; 
he  felt  that  he  could  demonstrate  his  superiority  to  his  confederate 
rivals  as  a  soldier,  to  the  same  extent  he  had  outstripped  them 
as  a  student  in  the  Academy,  and,  when  at  last,  by  bloodless 
strategy  he  should  have  them  cornered,  he  would  signify  to  them 
they  had  better  lay  down  their  arms,  be  good  and  loyal  citizens 
again,  and  he  would  arrange  matters  so  that  everything  "  would 
be  lovely,"  and;  they  would  have  all  their  "  rights." 

"We  do  not  positively  assume  this  theory  in  his  faver,  but  it  is 
entirely  consistent  with  his  known  loyalty;  and  to  say  the  truth, 
it  is  the  best  we  have.  And  if  perchance  we  are  correct,  we  can 
almost  imagine  the  broad  and  humane  expression  whi".h  spread 
over  his  benevolent  countenance  as  this  superb  idea  irradiated 
and  relieved  the  previously  agitated  depths  of  his  philosophic 
mind.  In  the  dim  vista  of  the  future,  he  might  behold  himselt 
toga'd  on  a  pedestal,  crowned  with  the  olive  as  well  as  with  the 
laurel,  and  continually  alluded  to  by  poetic  orators  as  the  second 
"Father  of  his  Country." 

We  find  much  to  harmonize  with  this  idea.  His  debut  was  made 
with  the  announcement  that  we  would  carry  on  the  war  with  as 
little  loss  of  life  as  possible,  and  we  have  seen  that,  though  the 
enemy,  in  vastly  inferior  numbers,  kept  thrusting  the  rebel  flag 
under  his  nose  at  Fairfax  Court  House;  nay,  at  Munson's  Hill  for 
several  months,  he  would  not  give  our  "Southern  brethren" 
battle.  They  even  blockaded  the  Potomac  on  him;  nay,  with  one- 
third  his  numbers  they  reduced  him  to  a  state  of  siege,  and  made 
daring  raids  upon  his  lines  from  day  to  daj ;  but  the  hour  had  not 
come  to  strike  the  crushing  blow  (perhaps  to  needlessly  exasperate 
the  feelings  on  both  sides),  and  he  bore  the  taunts  and  humiliations 
of  his  position  with  wondrous  fortitude.  What  probably  was  the 
most  embarrassing  part  of  his  position,  was  the  restless  chafing  of 
the  200,809  bayonets  at  his  back,  for  an  advance;  and  the  only  con 
solation  that  could  possibly  have  supported  him  in  this  trying  sit 
uation  was  the  consciousness  that  his  motives  were  correct,  and 
that  his  plan  would  bring  the  country  out  all  right  in  the  end. 


He  was  rather  unlucky  though,  for  the  war  was  terribly  exasper 
ated  in  the  West  by  Halleck,  Foote,  Grant,  Pope,  Mitchell,  Wal 
lace,  Curtis  and  Sigel;  and  in  the  South-West  by  that  rare  old  Gov 
ernor  Ben  Butler,  Farragnt  and  Porter;  and  in  the  South-East  by 
Burnside,  Sherman,  and  Dupont.  The  East,  where  we  had  the 
most  troops  and  the  greateal  general,  was  the  place  where  nothing 
was  done  at  all. 

It  was  something  to  our  Young  Napoleon,  nevertheless,  that  the 
People  kept  gazing  upon  him  in  a  sort  of  admiring  trance,  and, 
though  they  could  not  by  any  means  penetrate  his  plans,  they 
hurrahed  for  his  amazing  silence  and  inaction,  and  offered  to  "  bet 
their  lives  (as  fifty  thousand  did,  and  lost  them)  that  Little  Mac 
wasn't  keeping  so  still  for  nothing,  and  that  by-and-by  he  would 
come  out  all  right." 

At  length,  Little  Mac  did  move;  and  on  his  own  judgment  he 
chose  the  route  to  Richmond,  by  the  way  of  the  Peninsula.  It  was 
not  a  very  direct  road,  for  it  obliged  him  to  embark  and  debark  a 
vast  army,  and  make  a  long  trip  by  sea — a  process  that  is  always 
somewhat  demoralizing  to  troops,  and  always  very  filthy.  The  cost 
of  the  job  was  worth,  in  cash,  probably  some  fifty  millions— a 
sum  for  which  he  could  have  built  ten  railways,  and  defended 
them  as  they  went,  from  Washington  to  within  ten  miles  of  Rich 
mond. 

The  choice  of  route  was  therefore  thought  to  be  a  little  singular, 
and  some  querulous  civilians  likewise  thought  it  strange,  that 
having  so  long  refused  the  opportunity  to  strike  the  enemy  at  Ma- 
nassas,  with  quadrupled  numbers  in  his  favor,  he  should  take  a 
roundabout  road,  for  so  great  a  distance,  to  receive  odds  against  him 
self.  This,  however,  was  regarded  as  impertinent,  and  the  Young 
Napoleon  went  his  way,  backed  by  the  hopes  and  confidence  of  the 
whole  nation.  He  took  120,000  men  with  him,  which  was  all  he  asked 
for  at  that  time.  He  requested  more,  and  the  Government  forward 
ed  the  divisions  of  Franklin  and  McOall,  and  others,  until  he  had 
received  150,000  men;  and  there  was  but  19,022  lett  behind,  for  the 
defence  of  Washington.  The  Government  which  has  been  so 
roundly  villified  for  not  having  sent  him  more,  could  not  spare  an 
other  sold'ier,  for  the  divisions  of  McDowell  and  Banks  were  the 
necessary  stays  against  the  enemy  at  Fredericksburg  and  Warren- 
ton,  and  there  was  no  surplus  in  commission.  The  Young  Napo 
leon  might,  however,  have  had  them  all,  had  he  remained  at  Wash 
ington,  and  moved  with  them  upon  Richmond  from  that  point;  for 
he  would  thus  have  been  enabled  to  cover  the  Capital  and  the 
valley  of  the  Shenandoah  at  the  same  time,  and  to  have  kept  the 
odds,  too,  on  his  own  side. 

But  he  preferred  a  more  profound  and  complicated  policy,  and 
the  result  of  it  was,  that  the  enemy  caught  him  right  in  the  midst 
of  his  brilliant  strategy,  and  drove  him  pell-mell  out  of  it,  so  that 
he  burned  his  tents  and  stores,  and  fled  for  a  week,  leaving  his 
guns  in  large  numbers,  and  his  wounded  and  his  dead  behind  him. 
Instead  of  driving  the  enemy  to  the  wall,  they  ran  him  into  the 
mud,  and  brought  him  to  a  terrible  standstill  for  months.  The 
main  results,  therefore,  of  his  brilliant  strategy  are,  that  he  has 
cost  the  country  about  five  hundred  millions  of  dollars,  prolonged 
the  war  at  least  a  year,  reduced  his  army  practically  to  70,000  men, 
and  in  addition  to  paralyzing  it  for  months,  as  he  once  before  par 
alyzed  the  grand  army  of  the  Potomac,  he  has  actually  water-logged 
the  navy  also,  for  he  has  "  tied  up"  several  hundred  vessels  (trans 
ports  and  men-of-war),  in  the  simple  duty  of  feeding  and  protect 
ing  him.  The  minor  results  of  his  genius  are,  the  dejection  of  the 
country,  a  delude  of  shinplasters,  the  sneers  of  Europe,  the  hisses 


of  Oxford,  the  invigoration  of  the  rebel  cause  in  Parliament,  and 
the  confident  side  whisper  of  old  Palmerston  to  his  rampant  Com 
mons,  that  a  few  weeks  longer  will  bring  a  still  better  chance  for 
intervention.  Well  might  the  French  Princes  and  Beau  Astor 
leave  him  in  disgust,  and  well  might  he  send  forth  his  military 
orators  to  notify  the  People,  that  his  acts  are  sacred  from  analysis, 
and  that  he  is  a  great  general,  for  they  know  it, 

Now,  we  have  arrived  just  at  the  point  of  this  article  where  we 
wish  to  state,  that  we  believe  he  is  neither  a  great  general  nor  a 
clever  man;  and  to  further  express  our  conviction,  that  he  is  en 
tirely  unfitted,  by  reason  of  mental  inferiority,  for  any  broader 
military  task  than  the  management  of  a  brigade. 

There  are  many  ways  of  testing  intellectual  capacity,  and  we 
know  of  no  case  easier  for  this  purpose,  than  McOlellan's.  He  ig 
a  military  adept,  and  he  cannot  plan  ;  a  soldier,  and  he  cannot 
fight ;  a  scholar,  and  he  cannot  write.  There  is  not  one  of  his 
despatches  that  will  beai  the  analysis  of  a  schoolboy  ;  not  one  of 
his  bulletins  which  is  not  bloated  with  bombast;  not  one  of  his 
statements  that  is  not  vague,  foggy,  or  "purely  unintelligible." 

He  first  sprang  into  the  public  ring,  at  Rich  Mountain,  like  aH. 
acrobat  or  a  rope  dancer.  The  battle  of  that  name  was  really  per 
formed  by  Rosencranz;  but  though  a  simple  operation,  it  was  well 
conceived,  and,  notwithstanding  McClellan  was  not  present,  it,  by 
the  laws  of  practice,  accrues  to  his  credit,  as  the  senior  officer.* 
Well  do  we  bear  in  mind,  the  tenor  of  the  telegram  by  which  he 
announced  this  victory  to  the  world  ;  and  we  here  put  it  as  a  point 
of  inference,  whether  a  man,  who,  after  years  of  laborious  scholar 
ship,  can  be  so  grossly  inexact  in  the  deliberate  use  of  words,  can 
reasonably  be  expected  to  exhibit  any  mental  method  in  planning 
a  campaign;  or,  to  develope  accuracy,  while  arranging  his  bat 
talions  amid  the  perturbations  and  the  heat  of  action  1 

"  The  success  of  to-day,"  says  our  Napoleon,  "is  all  that  I  could 
desire.  We  captured  six  brass  cannons,  of  which  one  is  rifled,  all 
the  enemys'  camp  equipage  and  transportation,  even  to  his  cups. 
The  number  of  tents  will,  probably,  reach  two  hundred,  and 
more  than  sixty  wagons.  Their  killed  and  wounded  will  amount 
+o  fully  one  hundred  and  fifty,  with  one  hundred  prisoners." 
*  *  Their  retreat  is  complete.  *  *  I  may  say  we  have  driven, 
out  some  ten  thousand  men.  *  *  *  Then,  after  some  further 
grandiloquent  display,  Napoleon  closes  with  the  following  liter 
ary  cross,  between  the  styles  of  Mr.  Merriman  and  Uriah  Heap. 
"  I  hope  the  General-in-C/hief  will  approve  my  operations." 

"Does  the  razor  hurt  you,  sir  7"  says  the  barber,  when  conscious 
of  his  lightest  touch.  "A  little  applause  if  you  please,  ladies  and 
gentlemen  !"  imploringly  looks  Mr.  Merriman,  as  he  crosses  his 
legs  and  throws  out  his  fingers  from  his  lips,  after  a  clever  sum 
merset.  There  is  but  one  step  between  the  sublime  and  the  ri- 
diculoxis  :  so  the  public,  not  looking  for  a  mountebank,  and  being 
struck  with  this  strange  style,  picked  little  Mac  up  for  a  Napoleon! 

Then  came  the  proposition  for  a  bloodless  war — imagine  the  old 
Napoleon  doing  that  !— next  came  the  cruel  exoneration  of  Gen. 
Stone,  for  his  sacrifice  and  defamation  of  the  heroic  Baker,  who 
was  immolated  to  their  united  blunders  at  Ball's  Bluff;  next, 
Napoleon's  Zowvtoned  reflection  upon  the  misfortunes  of  a  brother 
onlcer  (who  would  have  harvested  his  victory  but  for  the  creature 
Patterson),  by  pompously  proclaiming  "no  more  retreats,  no 
more  defeats,  no  more  Bull  Run  affairs."  Then  followed  his  re 
peatedly  pretended  preparations  for  a  battle,  and  his  prescient 

*  By  the  same  rule,?however,  he  is  fully  responsible  for  the 
dreadful  blunders  and  butchery  of  Ball's  Bluff,  for  that,  the  first 
of  his  operations  as  Commander-in-Chief,  was  planned  and  ordered 
by  himself. 


a 

declaration,  that  the  closely  impending  conflict  would  be  "  short, 
sharp  and  bitter,"  though  time  has  revealed  that,  while  saying  so, 
he  did  not  mean  to  fight  at  all.  During  all  this  while,  he  went  rid 
ing  up  and  down  the  lines,  assuring  "the  boys"  that  if  they  would 
"  stick  by  him.,  he  would  stick  by  them,"  and  occasionally  telling 
them,  in  fie  imperial  vein,  to  have  no  fear,  for  he  would  expose 
his  sacred  person,  with  them,  in  the  dangers  of  the  field. 

We  next  find  Young  Napoleon  at  iforktown,  before  the  head  of 
an  army,  with  which  Old  Napoleon  would  have  marched  all  over 
Secessia,  and  back  again,  iti  six  months  ;  bat  instead  of  taking 
the  meager  city  by  assault,  and  giving  the  North  and  East  an  op 
portunity  to  sq_uare  accounts  of  glory  with  the  West,  his  bloodless 
Strategy  wa^  again  put  in  play,  and  he  distributed  the  shovel  in 
stead  of  drawing  forth  the  swor.l.  At  length  the  confederates, 
having  d^t'iine.l  him  long  enough  to  secure  the  arrival  of  their 
reinforcements  from  the  South,  made,  at  their  leisure,  a  masterly 
rekreat,  the  details  of  which  lasted  through  four  decorous  days. 
Nay,  a  single  spontaneous  rebel,  with  a  solitary  gun,  which  he 
ftpfld  on  his  own  hook  all  night,  after  the  confederates  were  gone, 
stayed  the  progress  of  our  army  for  several  hours  more.  Now 
mark  what  our  Napoleon  did.  H«  did  not  throw  up  redoubts  be 
fore  that  mail— though  under  his  Crimean  affliction  of  mud  upon 
the  brain,  he  must  have  been  sorely  tempted  to  such  course — but 
having  ascertained  that  the  enemy  had- indeed  marched  out,  he 
immediately  sent  off  a  handful  of  despatches,  stating  in  set  terms, 
lhat  ho  had  won  a  brilliant  victory  <  Yes,  victory  was  the  word  ! 
Nay,  not  satisfied  with  this,  and  though  the  enemy  had  burned  all 
their  refuse,  and  lost  not  a  single  wagon,  the  little  Mars  on  the 
fallowing  morning  sent  off  another  flood  of  telegrams,  announcing 
that  our  victory,  at  Yorktown,  had  proved  to  be  even  more  bril 
liant  than  he  had  at  ftrjt  supposed.  This  gross  misuse  of  language 
•would  seem  to  iniicate  either  a  conscious  want  of  fighting  prestige 
(did  we  say  of  courage?),  or  an  ignorance  of  the  true  weight  of 
•words  ;  but  if  neither  this  nor  that,  then  he  must  have  intended  to 
foist  a  false  idea  on  the  public.  But  the  climax  of  this  grand  ab 
surdity  was  yet  to  come,  and  it  did  come,  in  the  shape  of  another 
tejeejatn,  so  miserable  in  its  character,  so  measly  with  humility, 
ihat  a^ur  cheek  still  tingles  at  our  share  of  the  lo?s,  sustained 
through  it,  by  general  human  nature. 

"  May  I  be  permitted  to  allow  my  troops  to  inscribe  YORKTOWS  on 
their  banners,  as  other  generals  have  done  ?" 

This  is  so  pitiable,  and,  for  a  commander-in-chief,  so  deplorably 
mean-spirited,  that  we  do  not  care  to  dwell  upon  the  picture.  It 
eould  hardly  look  worse  if  he  had  sent  the  same  application  to 
Jeff  Davis,  on  the  subject  of  the  Chickahominy  !  But  the  confed 
erate  "  Uommander-in-Chief "  had  undoubtedly  "approved  of 
fois  operations  "  in  that  quarter! 

Jftext  came  the  affair  at  Williamsburg,  where  the  rear  guard  of  the 
enemy,  finding  us  pressing  after  them  too  closely,  turned  grandly 
back  and  gave  us  bitter  battle  The  fight  lasted  for  some  seven  hours. 
Q-en.  McOlellan  according  to  his  custom  arrived  upon  the  field  after 
tbe  strife  was  over,  and  having  reined  up  near  Hancock's  brigade, 
•was  made  cognizant  of  their  brilliant  closing  charge.  Ignoring, 
thereupon,  all  other  features  of  the  day,  he  sent  off  a  dispatch  in 
•vrhich  he  gave  credit  to  thatbrigade  alone.  That  credit  was?,  doubt 
less,  well  deserved,  but  it  had  been  earned  by  an  incidental  opera 
tion,  lasting  not  over  forty  minutes,  while  the  divisions  of  Hooker, 
and  Keese,  and  Kearney,  and  the  Excelsior  Brigade  of  Sickles, 
had  been  breathing  the  red  flame  of  battle  for  six  or  seven  hours. 
The  oth^r  reports,  however,  exhibited  the  gross  injustice  of  this 
single  compliment,  and,  at  the  end  of  several  days,  we  find  Napo 
leon  reluctantly  putting  forth  another  bulletin,  in  which  he  says, 


in  substance,  that  had  he  known,  when  writing  his  first  despatch,  <& 
the  gallant  services  performed  by  such  and  such  divisions  and  bri 
gades,  he  would  have  done  them  justice  at  the  time,  and  in  degree 
ag  he  should  learn  who  else  behaved  with  spirit,  he  would  awarfi 
them  equal  praise.  Was  ever  any  confession,  that  was  extorted 
under  threatened  consequences,  more  abject  and  significant  that 
this? 

But  there  is  a  crowning  absurdity  and  contradiction  yet  to  cot&t 
as  in  the  case  of  the  Yorktown  telegrams,  only  we  regret  to  say3 
that  the  climax,  in  this  case,  is  more  serious  than  in  the  other,  aacl 
hardly  reconcileable  with  ordinary  common  sense.  Two  or  three 
days  after  this  latent  recognition  of  a  brave  army's  toils  and  sacn~ 
flees,  G-eneral  Mcdellan  reviewed  Hancock's  brigade,  and  having 
expressed  a  few  words  of  warm  eulogium,  he  is  reported  to  hare 
said,  "  You  saved  our  army  from  disgrace  !"  Was  ever  statement 
like  this  heard  before  from  a  comm  inder,  about  his  army  ?  Who 
was  it  that,  but  for  this  small  squad,  would  have  betrayed  us  tc 
disgrace  1  Was  it  the  corps  d'armee  of  the  grim  old  Heintzelman  ? 
Was  It  Hooker's  or  Kearney's,  or  Sickles'  gallant  men  ?  Or,  was  it 
any,  or  all  of  the  regiments  whose  prowess  he  had  recognized  but 
two  or  three  days  before  1  We  do  not  wish  to  press  the  matter,  and 
we  hope  it  is  not  true.  If  it  be  not,  it  should  be  denied,  for  it  is  too 
heavy  a  weight  for  even  Ajax  to  carry  with  decorum,  down  the 
aisles  of  history. 

The  next  despatch  of  our  hero  relates  to  the  battle  of  Fair 
Oaks,  where  Casey's  skeleton  division  was  precariously  posted 
on  the  far  side  of  the  river,  and  so  far  in  front,  as  to  invite 
the  assault  of  some  forty  thousand  men.  This  exposed  hand 
ful  of  inexperienced  troops,  lately  recruited  from  Pennsylvania 
and  New  York,  of  course  recoiled,  as  did  the  veterans  at  Shiloh, 
under  the  stunning  blow;  nevertheless,  and  though  hundreds 
of  them  strewed  the  field,  they  rallied,  and  bravely  with 
stood  the  pressure  of  the  superincumbent  foe  for  full  three 
hours,  at  the  astounding  cost,  in  killed  and  wounded,  of  one- 
third  of  their  entire  number.  The  Commander-in-Ohief,  according 
to  the  reports,  did  not  arrive  upon  the  field  until  the  fight  was 
fairly  over.  Then  gathering  the  details,  probably  from  fugitives, 
he  dashed  off  a  despatch  which  he  ostentatiously  dated  "  From  the 
Field  of  Battle  !"  in  which  he  virtually  denounced  the  whole  divi 
sion  of  the  old  veteran,  as  cowards.  Lo,  in  about  ten  days  after 
ward,  he  was  obliged  to  swallow  one-half  this  despatch,  as  he  did 
that  of  Williamsburg,  and  to  acknowledge  that  he,  the  (Jomman- 
der-in-Ohief,  who  dated  his  despatch  so  blushingly  "from  the  field 
of  battle,"  had  been  misinformed  about  the  matter.  The  other  half, 
however,  still  rankles  in  the  hearts  of  many  a  man  and  woman  in 
the  Empire  and  the  Quaker  States, whose  sons  and  kinsmen  drench 
ed  that  cruel  field  in  expiation  of  the  fatal  strategy  of  Young  Na 
poleon.  The  shabby  recompense  was  perforce  accepted,  but  not  a 
citizen  of  either  State,  whose  stranded  youth  have  been  thus  fear 
fully  defamed  in  death,  can  lightly  pass  it  from  the  mind.  And  it 
is  because  of  this  wrong,  that  we  can  now  say  to  the  anonymous 
wretches  who  have  flooded  us  with  obscene  and  insolent  epistles 
about  these  articles,  that  we  personally  feel  we  owe  no  more  undue 
and  criminal  forbearance  to  McClellan's  blunders. 

But  he  was  not  yet  done  with  despatches,  even  in  relation  to  this 
battle;  for  in  the  face  of  the  fact  that  the  enemy  had  driven  him  from 
his"  camp  with  the  loss  of  many  guns,  and  that  they  had  slept  upon 
the  very  battle  ground,  onr  Young  Napoleon  announced  from  his 
waist-deep  location  in  the  mar.=h,  that  he  had  gained  a  decided  Ad 
vantage  over  them,  and  secured  a  better  position  than  before.  Subse- 
quentevents  have  shown,  however,  that  if  the  position  to  which  he 


10 

-was  thus  ingloriously  pushed  was  better, the  former  must  have  been 
hell  itself.  This  is  certainly  a  fair  conclusion,  for  in  a  few  days 
afterward,  he  was  driven  from  the  last,  at  a  cost  of  15,000  men  and 
about  thirty  cannon  ;  while  nothing  but  the  strange  valor  of  our 
soldiers,  and  the  talent  of  their  able  marshals,  combining  with  the 
fortunate  drunkenness  of  certain  (Jonfederate  Generals,  saved  our 
•whole  force  from  absolute  destruction.  The  latter  series  of  actions 
•which  effected  this  result,  opened  at  3  o'clock  on  the  morning  of 
the  26th  June,  but  McOlellan  did  not  make  his  appearance  on  the 
Seld  until  some  four  or  five  hours  afterwards.  The  fight  thus 
opened,  lasted  seven  days,  but  though  we  have  read  all  the  print 
ed  letters  within  our  reach,  about  the  matter,  we  fail  to  find 
more  than  one  mention  of  Napoleon,  during  the  prolonged  melee, 
and  that  mention  spoke  of  him  and  his  staff  as  riding  briskly  to  the 
rear,  while  whole  columns  were  sweeping  the  other  way  to  the 
attack.  A  strange  epilogue  to  the  "  stick  by  me  and  I'll  stick  by 
you"  orations  ! 

Yes,  at  the  close  of  affairs,  we  get  another  glimpse  of  him,  but 
*hen  he  had  made  port,  and  was  high  up  in  the  rigging  of  tlieGalena, 
with  a  spy-glass  in  his  hand,  surveying  the  turmoil  on  the  shore.  He 
mayhave  been  in  the  center  of  every  hot  encounter,  dealing  death 
upon  the  rebels  with  his  own  good  sword,  but  we  have  failed  to 
liear  of  it ;  and  it  has  not  been  our  good  fortune  to  find  a  single  tri 
bute  from  any  mercurial  reporter,  describing  the  modern  Napo 
leon's  coolness  v\  hen  some  ball  fell  near  him,  or  noticing  the  pleas 
ing  smile  which  overspread  his  face,  when  the  dirt  thrown  up  by 
some  adjacent  shell,  consecrated  him  with  the  real  baptism  of  bat 
tle.  These  reports  are  so  usual  in  campaigns,  that  it  is  singular 
they  should  be  omitted  in  this  case,  and  the  conclusion  therefore 
is,  either  that  the  reporters  were  exceedingly  remiss,  or  that  no 
auch  scenes  of  signal  hardihood  occurred. 

The  first  despatch  which  our  young  Commander  wrote  in  rela. 
tion  to  this  week  of  battles,  was,  as  the  London  Times  has  said 
about  his  plans,  "  purely  unintelligible."  By  dint  of  study,  how 
ever,  and  acute  translation,  we  gather  from  it,  the  general  idea,  that 
lie  has  outmanaged  the  enemy,  though  by  these  repeated  successes 
it  seems  he  has  been  terribly  reduced,  and'  forced  again  to  relin 
quish  the  musket  for  the  spade,  and  find  shelter  between  his  gun 
boats  and  redoubts. 

The  despatch  which  announced  this  fiasco  to  the  world,  again 
claimed  an  improvement  of  position,  and  with  the  deliberate  inten 
tion  of  imposing  on  the  country,  Napoleon  announced  that  he  had 
lost  but  one  siege  gun.  The  claquers  took  this  as  a  cue  for  their 
Jiosannahs,  and  encouraged  by  this  unexpected  demonstration,  our 
hero  sent  off  a  semi-official  letter,  stating  that  the  enemy  had  re 
treated.  It  was  probably  true  that  but  one  "siege"  gun  had  been 
lost*  but  we  were  entitled  to  know  how  many  guns  of  other  calibre 
and  fashion  were  lost  with  it.  It  was  not  true,  in  any  point  of 
Tiew,  however,  that  the  enemy  had  retreated,  for  McClellan  knew 
perfectly  well,  that  they,  having  driven  him  to  a  cowering  shelter 
tinder  the  protection  of  his  men-of-war,  had  merely  fallen  back  to 
a,  position  consistent  with  their  base  of  operations. 

We  have  thus  traced  our  Young  Napoleon  throughout  the  opera 
tions  of  this  war,  and  while  we  find  that  nine-tenths  of  the  hopes 
of  the  nation  were  centered  on  his  genius,  he  proves  to  be  the  only 
chieftain  who  has  brought  disaster  and  disgrace  upon  the  country. 
Look  at  him  from  what  point  ot  view  we  will,  he  is  certainly  the 
most  extraordinary  General  whoever  figured  on  the  page  of  his 
tory.  He  is  either  a  genius  or  he  is  nothing,  for  he  follows  none  of 
the  ordinary  theories,  and  does  everything  by  inversion.  He  does 
not  believe  at  all  in  the  policy  of  attack  ;  he  sees  no  moral  loss  or 
disadvantage  in  enduring  siege  from  inferior  numbers  ;  and,  with 


11 

a  principle  of  strategy,  not  very  well  established,  prefers  to  fight 
against  heavy  odds,  to  having  them.  The  President  required  him  to 
move  upon  Manassas,  but  he  obeyed  against  his  will,  and  every  bat 
tle  in  the  Peninsula  has  been  forced  upon  him  by  the  enemy.  When 
he  arrived  before  Yorktown,  with  his  120,000  men,  there  were  but 
8,CQO  Confederate  troops  within  its  walls,  and  had  he  then  instituted 
an  assault,  and  moved  thenceforward  promptly  upon  Richmond, 
he  might  have  escaped  the  disastrous  results  which  were  the  tough 
rewards  of  his  week  of  victory.  It  cannot  be  denied  that,  but  for 
the  gun-boats  which  now  cover  him  with  their  tremendous  en 
gines,  his  army,  which  was  to  "drive  the  enemy  to  the  wall," 
would  be  taken  "  stock  and  fluke,"  and  he,  perhaps,  be  figuring  in 
a  pen  in  Richmond.  And  let  us  say,  that  we  believe  this  the  only 
way  in  which  he  will  ever  get  to  Richmond,  from  his  present  supe 
rior  position,  unless,  by  the  providence  of  God,  some  man  more 
able  than  himself,  shall  make  a  diversion  upon  the  rebel  capital, 
that  V  ill  enable  him  to  co-operate  ;  or,  unless,  he  crawl  out  of  th« 
Peninsula  on  his  transports,  back  10  the  true  base  of  operations 
before  Washington. 

But  he  should  not  be  entrusted  again  with  a  superior  command. 
His  policy  is  too  inexplicable,  and  he  has  cost  us  enough  already. 
The  little  mud  fort  which  he  built  for  his  friend,  Pierre  Toutant 
Beauregard,  and  the  place  assigned  him  in  the  Lone-Star  move 
ment,  behind  his  associates  Sidney  Johnson,  J.  K.  L»uncan,  Mans 
field  Lovell  and  Gustavus  Smith, give  the  full  measure  of  his  value. 
Nay,  if  we  are  to  take  the  word  of  his  admirjers,  he  has  furnished 
it  himself  ;  for,  conscious  of  his  own  defects,  he  humbly  asked  the 
President  to  be  deposed  from  his  high  place — and  asked  it  virtually 
in  favor  of  a  man  who  started  in  the  race  for  eminence  behind  him. 
Alas,  for  human  glory,  and  particularly  lor  that  kind  01  glory 
which  could  not  keep  its  seat,  with  seven  hundred  thousand  bay 
onets  and  a  Nation  at  its  back. 

And  this  is  the  chieftain  who  we  are  told  is  a  "great  genius,"  "a 
second  Napoleon,"  "a  glorious,  gallant  and  unconquerable  lead 
er,"  and  who  we  are  forbidden  to  discuss,  on  pain  of  General 
Sickles'  suspicion  and  displeasure.  But,  to  use  a  common  phrase, 
this  system  ol  dragooning  is  "played  out,"  the  wand  of  Little  Mac 
is  broken,  and  the  public,  which  furnishes  the  men  and  foots  the 
bill,  is  thinking  for  itself.  "We  can  therefore  inform  Gen.  Sickles, 
with  all  the  modesty  becoming  a  civilian,  that  the  People  of  the 
city  of  New  York,  in  particular,  have  of  late  been  very  busy  ia 
forming  opinions  in  this  matter,  and  we  can  assure  him,  also,  that 
many  of  the  best  democrats  among  us,  believe,  that  if  this  "gifted" 
chieftain  had  died  a  year  ago,  the  war  would  have  been  over,  aud 
this  country  again  happy  and  united. 

And  they  have  much  cause  for  this  belief,  for  the y  sawMcClellan. 
unaccountably  restrain  the  chafing  army  of  the  Potomac  for  eight 
months  ;  and  they  now  behold  him  outdoing  his  earlier  strategy, 
by  paralyzing  the  navy  also,  and,  with  urgent  cries  of  help,  not 
only  weakening  the  maritime  resources  of  Mobile  and  New  Or 
leans,  bat  virtually  raising  the  blockade  of  Charleston  harbor. 
May  Heaven  protect  us  from  such  geniuses  !  The  public  at  large, 
though  it  may  not  be  able  to  manage  an  army,  can  reason  on  causes 
and  results  ;  and  New  York,  which  has  been  so  lavish  of  its  means 
and  men,  has  a  full  vote  in  desiring  to  be  relieved  of  a  leader  who 
is  BO  unlucky.  Generals  are  usually  court-martialed  for  suck 
reverses  as  have  happened  to  McClellan,  and  there  are  instances 
in  history,  where  unlucky  leaders  have  had  the  additional  misfor 
tune  to  be  shot.  General  Sickles  may  rest  assured  that  he  cannot 
resurrect  his  idol  by  mere  epithets  and  spells  of  prestige  ;  nor  can 
Young  Napoleon  himself  regain  his  ground  even  by  the  mostgra- 


12 

o*ions  devotion  of  his  talents  to  the  duties  of  the  hospital.  His  army 
•will  not  revolt,  as  has  been  threatened,  even  if  he  be  removed;  for 
they,  like  the  clearer-sighted  public,  mast,  by  this  time,  be  willing 
t»try  if  a  new  leader  may  not  bring,  at  least,  a  change  of  fortune. 

"We  would,  therefore,  respectfully'suggest  to  our  friend,  General 
Sickles,  that  he  had  better  fire  his  blank  cartridges  of  laudation 
without  impugning  the  intentions  and  motives  of  his  equals  ;  and 
•would  advise,  that  if  he  be  really  anxious  to  recruit  his  regiments, 
Ite  offer  pledges  to  our  shrinking  citizens  that,  if  they  will  but  en- 
JSet,  they  shall  not  be  consigned  to  the  fatal  leadership  of  the  Caesar 
af  the  Chickahominy. 

Finally,  if  General  Sickles  would  still  defend  the  genius  of  hia 
patron,  he  will  perhaps  favor  us  with  a  little  light  upon  one 
lingering  question.  The  Public,  without  being  too  importunate, 
wonld  like  exceedingly  to  know,  why  our  noble  army  was  allowed 
ao  long  to  canker  in  the  camps  of  the  Potomac,  while  the  rebel 
Jlag,  in  presence  of  the  Capitol,  flouted  the  manhood  and  prestige 
of  the  nation  ?  It  cannot  be  that  the  rising  Captain  bound  himself 
t»the  unknown  interest  which  put  him,  forward  for  the  dizzy  eminence 
qf  chief  command  to  pursue  a  prescribed  policy,  should  heb*.  appointed  ! 
for  his  pride  and  loyalty  would  have  discarded  such  prescription, 
att  soon  as  he  found  it  working  adversely  for  the  country.  He 
must  have  had  other  reasons  ;  and  what  those  reasons  were,  and 
why,  with  his  superabundant  troops,  which  were  equally  sea 
soned  with  the  enemy's,  he  did  not  "push"  the  ragged,  feeble  and 
retiring  rebels  of  Manassas  "  to  the  wall,"  should  no  longer  be  a 
mystery. 

At  this  late  date,  General  McClellan,  who  has  received  so  many 
JKvors  from  the  country,  will  probably  have  not  the  least  objection 
to  disclose.  He  can  communicate  his  answer  without  hesitation, 
*ad  confidentially,  if  he  desire,  for  we  will  tell  nobody  but  the 
jitblic,  and  we  are  all  friends  here.  G.  W. 


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THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 


